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Show Me the Money: The Application of
the Asset Forfeiture Provisions of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act and
Suggestions for the Future
Jorene Soto*
I. Introduction
Trafficking in persons, a modem-day type of slavery in which
people, especially women and children, are sold into forced labor and
sexual servitude, is a financially lucrative crime that is prevalent
throughout the world. Experts estimate that four million people are
trafficked each year,' generating up to ten billion dollars annually in
illicit funds.2 In 2000, the United States took a significant step to abolish
trafficking by taking the international lead in implementing the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).3 To eliminate the financial
profitability of trafficking, the TVPA provided for the civil and criminal
forfeiture of proceeds derived from trafficking activities. 4  In 2003,
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United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of
Immigration Appeals. Any opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do
not reflect the official position or views of the United States Department of Justice, the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, or the Board of Immigration Appeals. The
author would like to thank Professors Lederer and Mattar for their insight; Andrea for the
late-night brainstorming sessions; Ken for his constant support and devotion; and the staff
of the Penn State International Law Review for their hard work.
1. Becki Young, Trafficking of Humans Across Borders: How United States Laws
Can be Used to Punish Traffickers and Protect Victims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 73 (1998).
2. David France, Sarah Downey & Craig Nelson, Slavery's New Face, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 18, 2000, at 62 (citing former President Clinton's Inter-Agency Council on
Women's estimate valuing the global slave trade as a $9 million per year industry). See
also Ian Peck, Removing the Venom from the Snakehead: Japan's Newest Attempt to
Control Chinese Human Smuggling, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1041, 1044 (1998)
(stating that the worldwide profits for smuggling immigrants was estimated at $3 billion
in 1995 and had risen to $7 to $10 billion by 1997).
3. Pub. L. No. 106-386. § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464, 1470 (2000).
4. Pub. L. No. 106-386. § 1594, 114 Stat. 1464, 1489 (2000).
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Congress implemented the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003 (Reauthorization Act),5 which also added
the crime of trafficking in persons to the list of crimes defined as
"racketeering activities" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.6 Inclusion in the definition of a racketeering activity
subjects any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
contractual right constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
trafficker obtained, directly or indirectly, from their trafficking activity to
criminal forfeiture.7
Even with the implementation of the TVPA and the Reauthorization
Act, the United States is generally only able to seize the property of those
individuals who traffic in persons when that property is within the
country's borders. Recognizing this, it is possible that traffickers in
persons may deposit or invest their illicit wealth in foreign countries,
thereby avoiding the asset forfeiture laws associated with the
Reauthorization Act. As a result of this possible avoidance, the TVPA
and the Reauthorization Act may not, by themselves, effectively
eliminate the financial profitability of trafficking in persons which
entices many criminals to engage in this crime.
The amendments to add asset forfeiture provisions to the TVPA and
the Reauthorization Act were significant steps in eliminating the
financial profitability of trafficking in persons. However, this article will
assert that the United States government must recognize that
international cooperation is necessary in order to implement an
international asset forfeiture policy. Such a policy would ensure that the
assets of traffickers could be seized on a global level. As such, the
financial profitability of trafficking in persons would be more effectively
eliminated.
This article will first provide a brief historical background of the
potential monetary incentives of trafficking in persons. This article will
then address the shortcomings of the TVPA and the Reauthorization Act
as they relate to asset forfeiture. Section III will provide an overview of
the asset forfeiture provisions of the TVPA and the Reauthorization Act.
Section IV will explore how civil and criminal forfeiture provisions may
be enforced when the trafficker's assets are located abroad. Section V
will provide an overview of the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime8 and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
5. H.R. 2620, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
6. H.R. 2620, 108th Cong. §§ 5(a), (b) (2003).
7. Id.
8. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001).
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and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,9 two
treaties that allow for international asset forfeiture against traffickers.
Section VI will describe an overview of the use of mutual legal
assistance treaties to international asset forfeiture against traffickers in
persons. Finally, section VII will conclude that the United States should
ratify the aforementioned international treaties or implement effective
mutual legal assistance treaties so that the United States government may
attack the international assets of traffickers in persons in order to more
effectively eliminate the financial profitability of the crime.
II. Background
The assurance of a large amount of profit is the force that drives
individuals to engage in trafficking.' With profits of up to ten billion
dollars annually," trafficking in persons is the third most profitable
trafficking industry behind the trafficking of drugs and weapons.' 2
Furthermore, trafficking in persons has the potential to be much more
financially lucrative than trafficking in drugs or weapons.' 3  For
example, unlike drugs or weapons, which provide a one-time financial
transaction, the individual who traffics his victim into any given market
has a reusable commodity. 14  Specifically, a trafficker can resell his
victim to another trafficker, force his victim to prostitute herself
repeatedly, or force her to work countless hours in a sweatshop.'
5
A trafficker generally obtains his victim by kidnapping him/her,
16
9. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess, U.N. Doc. A/55/383.
10. See Peck, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Comm. On Foreign Relations,
106th Cong. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Hearings on International People Trafficking]
(statement of Frank E. Loy, Under Sec'y of State, Global Affairs) available at LEXIS,
Federal News Service.
13. This concept was discussed in detail in a trafficking in persons seminar given by
Professors Laura Lederer and Mohamed Mattar at the Georgetown University Law
Center in the spring of 2004.
14. Id.
15. Sally Stoecker, The Rise in Human Trafficking and the Role of Organized Crime,
8 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: THE JOURNAL OF POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 129, 130. See
Hearings on International People Trafficking, supra note 12 (statement of Regan E.
Ralph, Executive Dir., Women's Rights Div., Human Rights Watch providing that
traffickers who threaten to resell their victims increase their debt to decrease their
resistance).
16. See, e.g., MARTINA VANDENBERG, ISRAEL WOMEN'S NETWORK, TRAFFICKING OF
WOMEN TO ISRAEL AND FORCED PROSTITUTION 6-7 (1997) (describing how Russian
tourists were being kidnapped and sold in Israel); Yves Gery, The Dark Side of Europe:
Women for Sale, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE Feb. 1999, at 4, 7, (describing Polish women
being drugged and kidnapped from discotheques), available at http://www.monde-
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buying him/her from a family member, 17 or luring him/her with promises
of a new job and a better life.18 The trafficker must then supply the
initial financial costs necessary to traffic the victim from the country of
origin to the destination country. 19 Such an initial financial investment
may include, but is not limited to, the cost of fraudulent or photo-
switched passports and other travel documents, airline tickets and other
transportation costs, identification cards, driver's licenses, meals,
housing, bribes to immigration officials and law enforcement agents,20
and the assistance of professional smugglers.2'
After the victim is brought into the destination country, the
trafficker then passes the initial financial costs onto the victim, generally
at an exaggerated price, before he/she may be released from "debt.,
22
For example, a trafficker may charge a victim from $900 to $4,000 to
obtain his or her own passport.23 The trafficker may charge a victim
$700 for an identification card, $900 for a driver's license, or $1,000 for
both.24 The victim can only repay this "debt" to the trafficker by
working in forced labor or the commercial sex industry.25 If the victim
objects or does not produce enough money through work, the trafficker
often threatens deportation, physical harm, or death.26 The trafficker
diplomatique.fr/en.
17. See TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN IN ASIA, A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS 28 (Kinhide Mushakoji & Monica J. Washington, eds.,
1998) (describing families selling their daughters).
18. See AMY O'NEILL RICHARD, INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE
UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME
3-5 (1999); RENU RAJBHANDARI & LISA GIBSON, WOMEN's REHABILITATION CENTER
(NEPAL), ADVOCACY AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TRAINING MANUAL 33, 34
(1999) (explaining that women's lack of education and employment opportunities make
them a target for traffickers).
19. This concept was discussed in detail in a trafficking in persons seminar given by
Professors Laura Lederer and Mohamed Mattar at the Georgetown University Law
Center in the spring of 2004.
20. See RICHARD, supra note 18, at 17 (providing that a Thai trafficker paid law
enforcement officials $12,000 to "turn a blind eye" when they found him with 300
passports, and a Latin American trafficker paid bribes ranging from $200 to $500 to state
and local police).
21. See id. at 19 (providing that a Latin American "coyote's" fee for smuggling a
person into the United States ranges from $700 to $1,500 per person, whereas a Thai
smuggler's fee for smuggling a person into the United States ranges from $13,000 to
$15,000 per person).
22. See id. at 19.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. This concept was discussed in detail in a trafficking in persons seminar given by
Professors Laura Lederer and Mohamed Mattar at the Georgetown University Law
Center in the spring of 2004.
26. See Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American
Framework, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J., 29, 41 (2001) (noting that mute Mexicans
[Vol. 23:2
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may also cause physical harm to the victim, such as rape, beating,
drugging,27 or starving.28
In addition to the debt related to the victims' initial transportation
and smuggling costs, the victims are also charged additional expenses
after they arrive in the destination country.29 Such additional expenses
only add to the considerable debt that the victim is claimed to already
owe.3 ° Such additional expenses may include rent,3' food, clothes, drugs,
forced abortions, and any medical services.32 Prostitutes who worked at
the Russian Touch Massage parlor in Bethesda, Maryland, for example,
were charged $150 per week for their rent which allowed them to sleep
on massage tables at the massage parlor.33 Unfortunately, most victims
are kept in dirty, crowded housing in order to maximize the trafficker's
profits.34
Traffickers often earn huge profits through the manual labor or
sexual services of their victims, but the victims rarely see any of their
individualized earnings. 35 Trafficking victims who worked as prostitutes
in a New York brothel were forced to charge their clients $130, $30 of
which went to the madam of the brothel and $100 of which went to the
trafficker.36 In this situation, the victim could only earn money for
herself if she received tips from her clients.3 7 Similarly, traffickers in
West Palm Beach, Florida, charged their clients $22 for 15 minutes with
trafficked to the United States and forced to sell trinkets and beg were beaten if the did
not sell enough products or given their entire earning to their traffickers).
27. See VANDENBERG, supra note 16, at 6-7 (providing that women who object to
prostituting themselves were beaten, raped, and drugged).
28. VORASAKDI MAHATDHANOBOL, CHINESE WOMEN IN THE THAI SEX TRADE 41
(Aaron Stem trans., 1998) (providing that women were often denied food); see also
RICHARD, supra note 18, at 25 (also providing that women who refused to work were
denied food).
29. Gillian Caldwell et al., Capitalizing on Transition Economies: The Role of the
Russian Mafiya in Trafficking Women for Forced Prostitution, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
AND COMMERCIAL SEX: THE NEW SLAVE TRADE, at 42, 60 (Phil Williams ed., 1999)
(providing that women who worked at the "Russian Touch Massage" massage parlor in
Bethesda, Maryland, were charged $150 per week for their rent which consisted of
sleeping on the massage tables at the massage parlor at night).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ASIA WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A MODERN
FORM OF SLAVERY (providing that women were charged for the costs of doctor's visits
and medicine), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/thailand/.
33. See Caldwell, supra note 29, at 60.
34. See, e.g., STEVEN R. GLASTER & MELANIE E. ORNANT, GLOBAL SURVIVAL
NETWORK, TRAPPED: HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR FORCED LABOR IN THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 20 (1999) (providing that fourteen victims forced to
labor in sweatshops were forced to share one room and toilet).
35. Id.
36. See RICHARD, supra note 18, at 19.
37. Id.
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a trafficking victim, $10 of which went to the brothel and $12 of which
went to pay off the trafficking victim's initial "debt" of $2,000 to
$3,000.38 The situation appears to be similar in foreign countries.
Specifically, in Japan, many trafficking victims are forced to sign
confusing and deceptive illegal contracts that detail their performance
obligations to their trafficker. 39 As a result, trafficking victims in Japan
are generally unable to pay off their initial "debt" and, instead,
accumulate debt that may range from $35,000 to $300,000.40
The aforementioned methods create a strong economic incentive for
those who engage in the crime. While only a few individuals have been
convicted of trafficking in persons in the United States in the past
decade, those convicted had made millions of dollars doing so. 41 For
example, one trafficking ring made $8 million in fewer than five years by
forcing deaf Mexicans to peddle junk.42 Another trafficker made $2.5
million in approximately two years forcing women and girls into
prostitution.43 Likewise, a group trafficking in New York made $1.5
million in approximately one year forcing women into prostitution. 4
Finally, a group in California made $8 million in approximately six years
by forcing men and women to work in a sweatshop.45
III. Status Quo
A. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act Of 2000
President Bill Clinton signed the Act into law on October 28,
2000.46 Specifically, the Act set forth a three-pronged approach to
eradicate trafficking in persons: (1) providing for new protections and
assistance to victims; (2) expanding crimes and enhancing penalties
available to prosecutors to charge, prosecute, and convict; and
38. Id. at 20 (At that rate, it would take a trafficking victim 42 to 62 hours of sexual
activity to pay off her initial debt. However, the foregoing figure does not include any
additional "expenses" that the trafficking victim may be charged after her arrival in the
destination country. As previously noted, such additional charges include rent, food,
clothes, drugs, forced abortions, and any medical services they may need.).
39. See Caldwell, supra note 29, at 64-65 (providing that trafficking victims receive
a $50 allowance per day out of the minimum $800 they earn for the trafficker per day;
further providing that the traffickers are generally allowed to deductive a victim's earning
based on their own subjective evaluation of the victim's performance).
40. Id.
41. See RICHARD, supra note 18, at 19-20.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquerytr/z?dl 06:HR03244:@@@L&sunn2=m&.
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(3) expanding international activities of the United States to urge
countries to prevent trafficking and to assistthem in doing so.47 As one
of the significant penalties available to prosecutors to charge, prosecute,
and convict traffickers in persons, Congress provided for mandatory
asset forfeiture provision in the TVPA.48 This allows the government to
seize a trafficker's assets either through civil or criminal forfeiture.49 In
particular, this provision states that any individual who traffics or
attempts to traffic a person for the purpose of forced labor, peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, traffics in children for sex, or traffics in
adults for sex by force, fraud, or coercion forfeits their interest in real
and personal property used for or derived from the crime.50
B. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 0f2003
The Reauthorization Act added the crime of trafficking in persons to
the list of crimes defined as "racketeering activities" under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5' Specifically, the
Reauthorization Act amended RICO's definition of a racketeering
47. William J. Clinton, The President's Radio Address (Oct. 28, 2000), PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2351 (2002), available at 2000 WL 26850463.
48. Pub. L. No. 106-386. § 1594, 114 Stat. 1464, 1489 (2000). The asset forfeiture
provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act provides the following:
(b) The Court, in imposing sentence on any person convicted of a violation of
this chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and
irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person shall forfeit to the
United States-
(1) such person's interest in any property, real or personal, that was used
or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such
violation; and
(2) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any
proceeds that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of
such violation.
(c)(1)The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and
no property right shall exist in them:
(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used to
commit or to facilitate the commission of any violation of this
chapter.
(B) Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived
from proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter.
(2) The provisions of chapter 46 of this title relating to civil forfeitures shall
extend to any seizure or civil forfeiture under this subsection.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. H.R. Res. 2620 , 108th Cong. § 5(b) (2003) (enacted). Specifically, it states:
"Section 1961(1)(A) of Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
'murder-for-hire),' the following: 'section 1589 (relating to forced labor), section 1590
(relating to trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced
labor), section 1591 (relating to sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or
coercion.)'
2004]
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activity to include: 1) activitiesi, related to forced labor;52 2) activities
related to trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or forced labor;53 and 3) activities related to sex trafficking of
children or of adults by force, fraud, or coercion.54 The amendment of
this definition allows prosecutors to seize the trafficker's assets through
the process of criminal forfeiture only.15  In particular, the criminal
forfeiture provisions under RICO subjects any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds which the trafficker obtained, directly or indirectly,
from their trafficking activity to criminal forfeiture.5 6 Property subject to
criminal forfeiture includes: 1) real property, including things growing
on, affixed to, and found in land; and 2) tangible and intangible personal
property, including rights, privileges, interests claims and securities.57
All rights, title, and interest in property subject to criminal forfeiture
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2000).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2003).
55. Id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Specifically, it provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation
is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life
imprisonment), or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of
any provision of [s]tate law-
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962;
(2) any-
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of section 1962;
and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any
other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the
United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine
otherwise authorized by this section, a defendant who derives profits or other
proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or
other proceeds.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b). Specifically, it provides: "Property subject to criminal
forfeiture under this section includes-
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land;
and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims and securities."
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vests at the time of the commission-of the criminal racketeering act.58
IV. The Seizing Of Assets Located Outside Of The United States
Neither the TVPA nor the Reauthorization Act limits the United
States' ability to seize a trafficker's assets located outside of the
country. 59 However, the manner in which the United States government
seeks to seize a trafficker's assets will depend upon whether the
government initiates a criminal or a civil forfeiture action.60 Regardless
of which forfeiture action the United States government initiates, the
cooperation of foreign states is required in order to successfully enforce
asset forfeiture orders and seize assets located outside the United
States. 6 ' As such, bilateral agreements or international treaties are
necessary to achieve the purpose of the TVPA and the Reauthorization
Act.
A. Criminal Forfeiture Action
The TVPA and the Reauthorization Act both provide for a criminal
asset forfeiture action. 62 Criminal forfeiture is an in personam action,
which means that the court must obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.
63
If the court is able to gain jurisdiction over the defendant and the
defendant is convicted, it is the convicted defendant's interest in the
property that is forfeited rather than the actual property itself.64 A
convicted trafficker's assets may be automatically included in the
criminal forfeiture order, regardless of where those assets are located. 65
As a practical matter, however, other countries are generally reluctant to
enforce a criminal forfeiture provision against an individual criminally
convicted in a United States court unless there are provisions allowing
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c). Specifically, it provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other
than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and
thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee
establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section.
59. DEE EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL
COURTS.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 919-20 (11 th Cir. 2001).
65. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 982(b)(1), 19630) (1995); 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(a)(1) (1995).
2004]
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for such enforcement contained in their domestic law or unless there is a
bilateral agreement or international treaty between the two states.66
B. Civil Forfeiture Action
The TVPA provides for a civil forfeiture action.67 Civil forfeiture is
an in rem action.68  As such, the forfeiture action initiated by the
government is against the trafficker's property rather than the trafficker
himself.69  Therefore, it is only necessary for the court to gain
jurisdiction over the property in question. 70  Historically, the property
had to be within the court's jurisdiction.71 However, the United States
Congress has amended the legislation related to civil forfeiture so that
the government may bring a civil asset forfeiture action in a United
States district court regardless of where the assets are located.72 Even so,
the court's jurisdiction over international property is a legal fiction
without the cooperation of the country where the property is located. 73 If
the foreign country does not agree to enforce a district court's civil
forfeiture order, the United States government will be unable to seize the
property.
74
V. Current Applicable International Law
A. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (Convention) was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 15, 2000, and entered into force on September
29, 2003. 75 It is a treaty that imposes legally binding obligations on
those nations that ratify or accede to it. 76 The United States is a signatory
to the Convention, but is not a member to the Convention because it has
66. William J. Snider, International Cooperation in the Forfeiture of Illegal Drug
Proceeds, 6 CRiM. L.F. 377, 381 (1995).
67. EDGEWORTH, supra note 59.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1355(b)(2) (1995).
73. Id.
74. See U.S. v. All Funds on Deposit in Name of Meza, 856 F. Supp. 759, 763
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 63 F.3d 148 (2d. Cir. 1995).
75. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note
8. Currently, there are 147 signatories to the Convention and 66 parties.
76. Id.
[Vol. 23:2
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not yet ratified it. 77
The Convention does not specifically define trafficking in persons
as a transnational organized crime. The offenses included within the
Convention are defined broadly. They include the following: (1) a
serious crime for a purpose relating to the benefit and involving an act
undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of or involving in
organized criminal group; 78 (2) the illicit laundering of the proceeds of
crime;79 (3) official corruption;80 (4) obstruction of justice;8 and (5) a
"serious crime" where the offense is transnational in nature and involves
an organized criminal group.82 A "serious crime" is defined by the
Convention as "conduct constituting an offense punishable by a
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious
penalty. 83 The Convention's usefulness with respect to trafficking in
persons and this article lies in the articles that relate to asset forfeiture.
Article 13 of the Convention describes the obligations of the State
Party that submits a request for the confiscation 84 of the proceeds of
crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities related to
trafficking in persons; it further describes the obligations of the state
party receiving such a request.85  Pursuant to Article 13, the sending
77. Id.
78. Id. at Art. 3.
79. Id. at Art. 5.
80. Id. atArt. 6.
81. Id. at Art. 8.
82. Id. at Art. 23.
83. Id. at Art. 2(b).
84. Id. at Annex I, Art. 2(g). The Convention describes what is commonly referred
to in the United States as asset forfeiture as "confiscation." The Convention defines
"confiscation" as the "permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other
competent authority."
85. Id. at Art. 13. International cooperation for purposes of confiscation. It
provides:
1. A State Party that has received a request from another State Party having
jurisdiction over an offence covered by this Convention for confiscation of
proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in
article 12, paragraph 1, of this Convention situated in its territory shall, to the
greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system:
(a) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of
obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, give
effect to it; or
(b) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to
the extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by a court in the
territory of the requesting State Party in accordance with article 12,
paragraph 1, of this Convention insofar as it relates to proceeds of crime,
property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12,
paragraph 1, situated in the territory of the requested State Party.
2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction over an
offence covered by this Convention, the requested State Party shall take
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
State Party must provide a description of the property to be forfeited and
a statement of the facts relied upon for making the request. 86 In certain
cases, the sending state must also provide a legal copy of an order of
confiscation upon which the request is based and a description of the
action requested. 87  Under.Article 13, the receiving State Party must
submit the request to the appropriate authority in order to give effect to
it.88  The receiving State Party must further attempt to carry out the
sending state party's request by taking measures to identify, trace, and
freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, equipment, or other
measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property,
equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, of
this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by
the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under paragraph 1 of this
article, by the requested State Party.
3. The provisions of article 18 of this Convention are applicable, mutates
mutandis, to this article. In addition to the information specified in article 18,
paragraph 15, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain:
a. In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1(a) of this article, a
description of the property to be confiscated and a statement of the facts
relied upon by the requesting State Party sufficient to enable the requested
State Party to seek the order under its domestic law;
b. In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph l(b) of this article, a
legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation upon which the request
is based issued by the requesting State Party, a statement of the facts and
information as to the extent to which execution of the order is requested;
c. In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph - of this article, a
statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party and a
description of the actions requested.
4. The decisions or actions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article,
shall be taken by the requested State Party in accordance with and subject to the
provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or
multilateral treaty, agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in
relation to the requesting State Party.
5. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that give
effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws and regulations
or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
6. If a State Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article conditional on the existence of a relevant
treaty, that State Party shall consider this Convention the necessary and
sufficient treaty basis.
7. Cooperation under this article may be refused by a State Party if the offence
to which the request relates is not an offence covered by this Convention.
8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of
bona fide third parties.
9. State Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral treaties,
agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international
cooperation undertaken pursuant to this article.
86. Id. at Art. 13.3(a).
87. Id. at Art. 13.3(b-c).
88. Id. at Art. 13.1(a).
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instrumentalities related to trafficking in persons.89
Article 14 describes the obligations on the sending and receiving
State Parties with respect to the disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime
or property related to trafficking in persons. 90  Ultimate authority
concerning the disposition of the proceeds of crime or property
confiscated by a State Party lies with the domestic law of the
confiscating state.91 However, the Convention requires all State Parties,
if possible, to give priority consideration to returning the proceeds to the
requesting state for the purpose of compensating the victim(s) or
returning the property to its original owner.92  State Parties are also
directed to consider donating the proceeds to intergovernmental bodies
that specialize in combating organized crime or sharing proceeds with
other State Parties.93
B. Protocol To Prevent, Suppress, And Punish Trafficking In Persons,
Especially Women And Children
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Protocol), was
implemented as a supplement to the Convention. The Protocol was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 15, 2000
89. Id. at Art. 13.2.
90. Id. at Art. 14. Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property.
Specifically, it provides:
1. Proceeds of crime or property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to
articles 12 or 13, paragraph 1, of this Convention shall be disposed of by that
State Party in accordance with its domestic law and administrative procedures.
2. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with
article 13 of this Convention, States Parties shall, to the extent permitted by
domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning the
confiscated proceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so that it
can give compensation to the victims of the crime or return such proceeds of
crime or property to their legitimate owners.
3. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with
articles 12 and 13 of this Convention, a State Party may give special
consideration to concluding agreements or arrangements on:
a. Contributing to the value of such proceeds of crime or property or funds
derived from the ale of such proceeds of crime or property or a party
thereof to the account designated in accordance with article 30, paragraph
2(c), of this Convention and to intergovernmental bodies specializing in
the fight against organized crime;
b. Sharing with other States Parties, on a regular case-by-case basis, such
proceeds of crime or property, or funds derived from the sale of such
proceeds of crime or property, in accordance with its domestic law or
administrative procedures.
91. Id. at Art. 14.1.
92. Id. at Art. 14.2.
93. Id. at Art. 14.3.
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and it entered into force on December 25, 2003. 94 The Protocol also
imposes legally binding obligations on those nations which ratify or
accede to it. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Protocol
and therefore is not a member to it.
Article 1 articulates the relation between the Protocol and the
Convention. 95  Recognizing that, as of the date of its adoption, some
member States had not criminalized the act of trafficking in persons or
had not implemented a punishment so severe that it would rise to the
level of a "serious crime" as defined in the Convention, the Protocol
specifically provides that the offenses established in accordance with the
Convention include the offense of trafficking in persons.96 The Protocol
defines trafficking in persons as:
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.97
The Protocol also provides that the consent of a victim of trafficking
in persons is irrelevant where force, fraud, or coercion is used.98
Furthermore, the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or
receipt of a person under the age of eighteen for the purpose of
exploitation constitutes trafficking in persons.99
Although the Protocol does not contain an asset forfeiture provision,
it specifically provides that the provisions of the Convention apply to the
Protocol. 100 As such, the asset forfeiture provisions contained in the
94. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note
9. Currently, there are 117 signatories to the Protocol and 45 parties.
95. Id. at Art. 1. Relation with the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime. It provides the following:
1. This Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime. It shall be interpreted together with the
Convention.
2. The provisions of the Convention shall apply, mutates mutandis, to this
Protocol unless otherwise provided herein.
3. The offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol shall be
regarded as offences established in accordance with the Convention.
96. Id. at Arts. 1, 3, 5.
97. Id. at Art. 3(a).
98. Id. at Art. 3(b).
99. Id. at Art. 3(c).
100. Id. at Art. 1.2.
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Convention apply directly to the crime of trafficking in persons.
VI. The Use Of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties And Other Types Of
Bilateral Agreements
Although the United States has failed to ratify the Convention and
the Protocol, it has entered into numerous mutual legal assistance
treaties. Mutual legal assistance treaties are essentially bilateral treaties
that impose legally binding obligations on the two nations that enter into
them. Mutual legal assistance treaties and other types of bilateral
agreements regarding trafficking would allow the United States to
request the seizure of a trafficker's assets in a foreign country even if the
United States fails to ratify the Convention and the Protocol. The
development of such treaties and other types of bilateral agreements
between the United States and other countries has increased rapidly in
the past few decades.' 0' A number of bilateral agreements to which the
United States is a party address the issue of asset forfeiture; however,
asset forfeiture is generally addressed only with respect to drug
trafficking. 0 2  At least one mutual legal assistance treaty briefly
addresses asset forfeiture with relation to trafficking in persons-the
101. See William J. Snider, supra note 66. MLAT, Dec. 4, 1990, U.S.-Arg. (entered
into force Feb. 9, 1993); MLAT, June 12-Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Bah. (entered into force
July 18, 1990); MLAT, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can. (entered into force Jan. 24, 1990);
MLAT, Nov. 9, 1982, U.S.-Italy (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985); MLAT, Dec. 9,
1987, U.S.-Mex. (entered into force May 3, 1991); MLAT, Oct. 17, 1983, U.S.-Morocco
(entered into force June 23, 1983); MLAT, June 12, 1981, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No.
10734, 1359 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1983); MLAT, Nov. 20, 1990,
U.S.-Spain (entered into force June 30, 1993); MLAT, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27
U.S.T. 2019, 1052 U.N.T.S. 61 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977); MLAT, Mar. 19, 1986,
U.S.-Thail. (entered into force June 10, 1993); Treaty on Extradition and Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, U.S.-Turk., 32 U.S.T. 3111 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1981); MLAT, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K. (entered into force Mar. 19, 1990)
(covering Cayman Is.), amended Nov. 9, 1990 T.I.A.S. No. 11765 (entered into force
Nov. 9, 1990) (covering Anguilla, Brit. Virgin Is., Turks & Caicos Is.), amended Apr. 26,
1991 (entered into force April 26, 1991) (covering Montserrat); MLAT, May 6, 1991,
U.S.-Uru. (entered into force Apr. 15, 1994). Id.
102. Agreement on Transfer of Forfeited Assets from Drug Trafficking, Apr. 19,
1994, U.S.-Cayman Is. (entered into force Apr. 19, 1995); Memorandum of
Understanding on Cooperation in Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds of Illicit Narcotics
Trafficking, July 24, 1990, U.S.-Colom. (entered into force July 24, 1990); Agreement on
Cooperation in the Control of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Nov. 5-20, 1971, U.S.-
Ecuador, 22 U.S.T. 2109 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1971); Agreement on Confiscation
of Proceeds of Drug Trafficking, Nov. 23, 1990, U.S.-Hong Kong (entered into force Jan
18, 1991); Agreement on Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offences and Seizure of
Proceeds, Feb. 9, 1988 (as amended Jan. 6, 1994), (U.S.-U.K., T.I.A.S. No. 11649
(entered into force Apr. 11, 1989); Agreement on the Transfer of Forfeited Assets
Connected to Drug Trafficking, May 19-22, 1995, U.S.-Mex. (entered into force May 22,
1995).
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United States' mutual legal assistance treaty with Switzerland."°3 This
treaty could be used as the framework for future mutual legal assistance
treaties with other countries.
Article 1 of the mutual legal assistance treaty between the United
States and Switzerland specifically provides that, "Contracting Parties
undertake to afford each other, in accordance with provisions of this
Treaty, mutual assistance in . . . effecting the return to the requesting
State, or a state or canton thereof, of any objects, articles or other
property or assets belonging to it and obtained through such offenses."'0
4
The schedule of offenses contained within the treaty for which
compulsory measures are available includes trafficking in women and
children. Chapter VII describes the obligations on the State Party
sending a request, and Chapter III describes the obligations on the State
Party receiving the request. 0 5 However, neither chapter addresses each
state's obligations with respect to asset forfeiture. Specifically, the
mutual legal assistance treaty does not provide what type of
documentation or level of proof the requesting state must send to the
receiving state to prove that it has a right to obtain forfeited property, nor
does it state the level of cooperation the receiving State Party must
provide to the requesting party. Accordingly, it is unclear how the asset
forfeiture provision of the mutual legal assistance treaty between the
United States and Switzerland is effectively carried out. In the future, a
more descriptive mutual legal assistance treaty that details the
obligations of each State Party with respect to the issue of asset forfeiture
is necessary to effectuate the international forfeiture of proceeds related
to trafficking in persons.
VII. Conclusion
Trafficking in persons is a highly profitable crime. 10 6 The United
States must develop an effective asset forfeiture policy against traffickers
in persons in order to eliminate the profit of the crime. The current asset
forfeiture provisions contained in the TVPA and the Reauthorization Act,
by themselves, are insufficient because traffickers in persons are able to
evade domestic forfeiture laws by placing their assets and property
outside of the United States. The United States needs international
cooperation in order to have an effective asset forfeiture policy that is
able to successfully eliminate the financial profitability of trafficking in
103. MLAT, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, 1052 U.N.T.S. 61 (entered
into force Jan. 23, 1977).
104. Id. Art. 1.
105. Id. Chs. III, VII.
106. See Peck, supra note 2.
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persons. Therefore, it is essential that the United States ratify the
Convention and the Protocol as quickly as possible and pursue the
creation of comprehensive mutual legal assistance treaties with those
countries who have not ratified the Convention or the Protocol.

